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Housing and Macroeconomy: The Role of Credit Channel, Risk -,
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Abstract
This paper demonstrates that risk (uncertainty) along with the monetary (interest rates) shocks to the
housing production sector are a quantitatively important impulse mechanism for the business and hous-
ing cycles. Our model framework is that of the housing supply/banking sector model as developed in
Dorofeenko, Lee, and Salyer (2014) with the model of housing demand presented in Iacoviello and Neri
(2010). We examine how the factors of production uncertainty, nancial intermediation, and credit con-
strained households can aect housing prices and aggregate economic activity. Moreover, this analysis is
cast within a monetary framework which permits a study of how monetary policy can be used to mitigate
the deleterious eects of cyclical phenomenon that originates in the housing sector. We provide empirical
evidence that large housing price and residential investment boom and bust cycles in Europe and the U.S.
over the last few years are driven largely by economic fundamentals and nancial constraints.We also nd
that, quantitatively, the impact of risk and monetary shocks are almost as great as that from technology
shocks on some of the aggregate real variables. This comparison carries over to housing market variables
such as the price of housing, the risk premium on loans, and the bankruptcy rate of housing producers.
 JEL Classication: E4, E5, E2, R2, R3
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1 Introduction
Figure 1 shows the dramatic rise and fall of real housing prices for the U.S. and some of the
selected European countries1 from the rst quarter of 1997 to the second quarter of 2011. The
U.S. housing market peaked in the second quarter of 2007 with the price appreciation of 122
percent.2 In comparison to Ireland (300 percent), Greece (185 percent), and Spain (163 percent)
and with each country having slightly dierent peak periods, the U.S. housing price appreciation
is not only in-line with the rest of the economies but also is relatively mild3. With the subsequent
pronounced decline in house prices in these economies from their peaks during the mid 2000's,
there is a growing body of literature that describes these large swings in housing prices as bubbles
or these sharp increases in housing prices were caused by irrational exuberance4, and subsequently,
these housing price bubbles then are the causes of the recent global nancial instability.
Given the recent macroeconomic experience of most developed countries, few students of the
economy would argue with the following three observations: 1. Financial intermediation plays
an important role in the economy, 2. The housing sector is a critical component for aggregate
economic behavior and 3. Uncertainty, and, in particular, time-varying uncertainty5 - and mon-
etary shocks are quantitatively important sources of business cycle activity. And while there has
no doubt been a concomitant increase in economic research which examines housing markets and
nancial intermediation, only a few analyses have been conducted in a calibrated, general equi-
librium setting; i.e. an economic environment in which the quantitative properties of the model
1 We have selected Ireland, Spain, Greece, Italy and Portugal for our illustration purpose. Moreover, these
countries are purposely chosen as most of them are currently experiencing a great nancial diculties. We also
include Germany, who has not experienced any housing or nancial crisis, to use as a benchmark comparison.
2 Unlike the Case-Shiller index that has an appreciation of 122 percent, the Oce of Federal Housing Enterprise
Oversight (OFHEO) experienced 77 percent appreciation. The dierence between the The Oce of Federal Housing
Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO) and Case-Shiller housing price indices arises largely from the treatment of expensive
homes. The OFHEO index includes only transactions involving mortgages backed by the lenders it oversees, Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac, which are capped at $417,000. The Case-Shiller measure has no upper limit and gives more
weight to higher-priced homes.
3 The following countries have experienced less of an appreciation: Portugal (44 percent), Italy (70 percent) and
Germany (-4.2 percent) with even depreciation.
4 The term Irrational Exuberance was rst coined by Alan Greenspan, the former chairman of the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve in 1996 at the U.S. Congress testimony.
5 We dene and estimate these uncertainty (risk) shocks as the time variation in the cross sectional distribution
of rm level productivities. The detail analysis of the risk shock estimation follows in the later section.
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are broadly consistent with observed business cycle characteristics with various shocks.6 The
objective of our paper is to develop a theoretical and computational framework that can help us
understand: [1] how does uncertainty in lending channel eect economies (including both nancial
and housing markets) at dierent stages of business cycle; [2] what are the ects associated with
credit constrained heterogenous agents on the housing prices and the business cycle; and [3] what
types monetary policies might help (or hinder) the process of housing and nancial development.
To address the aforementioned questions, we use the framework of the housing supply/banking
sector model as developed in Dorofeenko, Lee, and Salyer (2014) with the model of housing demand
presented in Iacoviello and Neri (2010). In particular, we examine how the factors of production
uncertainty, nancial intermediation, and credit constrained households can aect housing prices
and aggregate economic activity. Moreover, this analysis is cast within a monetary framework
of Carlstrom and Fuerst (2001) which permits a study of how monetary policy can be used to
mitigate the deleterious eects of cyclical phenomenon that originates in the housing sector.
The Dorofeenko, Lee, and Salyer (2014) model focuses on the eects that housing production
uncertainty and bank lending have on housing prices. To do this, their analysis combines the multi-
sector housing model of Davis and Heathcote (2005) with the Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) model
of lending under asymmetric information and agency costs since both models had been shown to
replicate several key features of the business cycle. In particular, the Davis and Heathcote (2005)
model produces the high volatility of residential investment relative to xed business investment
seen in the data. However, the model fails to produce the observed volatility in housing prices.
To this basic framework, Dorofeenko, Lee, and Salyer (2014) introduce an additional impulse
mechanism, time varying uncertainty (i.e. risk shocks) shocks to the standard deviation of the
entrepreneurs' technology shock aecting only the housing production, and require that housing
6 Some of the recent works which also examine housing and credit are: Iacoviello and Minetti (2008) and
Iacoviello and Neri (2010) in which a new-Keynesian DGSE two sector model is used in their empirical analysis;
Iacoviello (2005) analyzes the role that real estate collateral has for monetary policy; and Aoki, Proudman and
Vliegh (2004) analyse house price amplication eects in consumption and housing investment over the business
cycle. None of these analyses use risk shocks as an impulse mechanism. Some recent papers that have examined
the eects of uncertainty in a DSGE framework include Bloom et al. (2012), Fernandez-Villaverde et al. (2009),
Christiano et al. (2015), and Dorofeenko, Lee and Salyer (2014) with housing markets.
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producers nance the purchase of their inputs via bank loans. Dorofeenko, Lee, and Salyer (2014)
model risk shocks as a mean preserving spread in the distribution of the technology shocks aecting
only house production and explore quantitatively how changes in uncertainty aect equilibrium
characteristics.7 The importance of understanding how these uncertainty or risk shocks aect the
economy is widely discussed in academics and among policymakers. For example, Baker, Bloom,
and Davis (2012) demonstrates that a long persistent sluggish economic recovery in the U.S. (e.g.
low output growth and unemployment hovering above 8%) even after the bottoming of the U.S.
recession in June 2009 could be attributed to the high levels of uncertainty about economic policy.
In Dorofeenko, Lee, and Salyer (2014), these factors lead to greater house price volatility as
housing prices reect potential losses due to bankruptcy for some housing producers. In fact,
the model is roughly consistent with the cyclical behavior of residential investment and housing
prices as seen in U.S. data over the sample period 1975-2010. However, Dorofeenko, Lee, and
Salyer (2014) model is not consistent with the behavior of housing prices and rm bankruptcy
rates as seen in the recent decade. This failure is not surprising since the role of shocks to housing
demand combined with changes in household mortgage nance are not present. Consequently, in
this paper, we embed key features of the recent model by Iacoviello and Neri (2010) to rectify
this omisssion. As detailed below, the main features of the Iacoviello and Neri (2010) model
that we employ are the introduction of heterogenous agents (patient and impatient), a borrowing
constraint (which aects impatient households) and a monetary authority that targets ination
via interest rate. We then introduce housing demand shocks (via preferences) and examine how
these get transmitted to the economy. Next we examine optimal monetary policy in this setting.
In analyzing the role of the LTV (Loan to Value) ratio on macro and housing variables, we
present three dierent scenarios that are based on LTV ratio: low (80), middle (85) and high (90)
borrowing constraints. These dierent levels of LTV ratio are, for an expositional purpose, to
7 One should note that the time varying risk shocks in this paper are quite dierent than the pure aggregate
or sectoral technology (supply) shocks. First, risk shocks aect only the housing production sector. Second, risk
shocks are meant to represent the second moments of the variance. That is, these time varying risk shocks proxy
the changes in eocnomic environment uncertainty.
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reect three dierent European economies: Germany, Italy and Spain. According to IMF (2011)
(also shown in Table 5 in the Appendix), Germans have one of the lowest LTV ratio, whereas
Spanish borrowers have one of the highest LTV ratio with Italy being in between these two levels.8
HERE I NEED TO WRITE SOMETHING ELSE OR UPDATE THE RESULTS!!!!
Unlike some of the recent literature that emphasize the important role of the level of LTV on
housing market, our results indicate otherwise: almost no dierences between dierent levels of
LTV on the variables that we analyze. On the role of speci shocks, we show that the eects
of monetary shocks are huge on most of the macro variables and in particular on the housing
investment and the amount of borrowing the households undertake: over 75 percent and almost
50 percent of the variation in housing investment and borrowing can be explained by the monetary
shocks. On the contrary to monetary shocks, housing demand shocks have a trivial impact on all
the variables that we analyze: at most 6 percent of the variation in housing price can be explained
by the preference shocks. Lastly, our endogenous debt nancial accelerator model with risk shocks
lends a strong support for the important role of risk shocks: over 85 percent of the variation in
housing price is due to risk shocks. Our results, thus, show that there is a clear and an important
role for the policy makers to smooth housing price and/or housing investment: to calm markets
and to provide and restore market condence.
2 Model: Housing Markets, Financial Intermediation, and
Monetary Policy
Our model builds on three separate strands of literature: Davis and Heathcote's (2005) multi-
sector growth model with housing, Dorofeenko, Lee and Salyer's (2008, 2014) credit channel
model with uncertainty, and Iacoviello and Neri's (2010) model of housing demand. In this
paper, however, we do not consider any other New Keynesian economic frictions other than the
8 Some of the recent housing market developments for various European countries are discussed in the Appendix.
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asymmetric information friction that occurs in the loan contract between the mutual fund and
entrepreneurs.
First we specify the households' optimization problem in a representative agent economy in
which the demand for money is motivated by a cash-in-advance constraint. Then, this environment
is modied by dividing the households into two groups, patient and impatient (a la Iacoviello and
Neri's (2010)) . This will introduce a role for household lending and borrowing. We then introduce
nancial intermediation ("banking") sector, where the patient households lend savings to bankers,
and the bankers then lend to both impatient households and entrepreneurs (housing producing
agents). With the banking sector, the state of the economy (which is measured in this paper by the
level of "uncertaity" or "risk") eects the lending amount and the probability of loan default, and
hence eecting the net worth of these nancial intermediaries. And consequently, the endogenous
net worth of the nanical intermediary sector could in fact contribute aggregate movements in
various nancial and macro variables. Finally, we include government in setting monetary policy
rule with a variation of the Taylor Rule.
Here is a brief outline and summary of the environment of this economy: Figure 2 shows a
schematic of the implied ows for this economy.
 Three types of agents:
{ Risk-averse patient (impatient) households that choose consumption, labor, money
holding, and housing service: Lend (borrow) money to (from) the nancial intermedi-
aries.
{ Risk-neutral entrepreneurs (housing developers) that choose consumption, investment,
and labor.
 Cost of inputs is nanced by borrowing
 Housing production subject to risks shocks.
 Multisectors: 6 Firms
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{ Three intermediate goods producing: Construction, Manufacturing, and Service
{ Two "nal" goods production: Residential Investment and Consumption / Non-residential
Investment
{ Housing Production (via entrepreneurs): Residential Investment + Land.
 A mutual fund: Financial intermediaries (that guarantees a certain return to house-
holds through lending to an innite number of entrepreneurs).
 Government: Lump sum money transfer and taxes.
 Shocks: 6 dierent shocks
{ 3 sectoral productivity technology shocks: Construction, Manufacturing and Service
{ Idiosyncratic technology shocks (!t ) aecting housing production.
 Denoting the c:d:f: and p:d:f: of !t as  (!t;!;t) and  (!t;!;t).
 Second moment, !;t; (i.e. risk) shocks aecting the distribution of these Idiosyn-
cratic technology shocks.
{ Monetary shocks: a la Taylor Rule.
{ Housing demand (preference) shocks.
2.1 Money and cash-in-advance constraint in housing model: House-
holds
This section follows the work of Carlstrom and Fuerst (2001) but adds loans and collateral restric-
tions on the demand side as in Iacoviello and Neri (2010). Households maximize lifetime utility
given by:
E0
 1X
t=0
tU (ct; ht; 1 Nt)
!
(1)
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w.r.t. its consumption ct, labor hours Nt, capital Kt and housing ht stocks, the investment into
consumption ik;t and housing ih;t goods sectors, and money holdings Mt subject to the budget
constraint (where we let  to denote the Lagrange multiplier):
ct + ik;t + ph;tih;t +
Mt+1
Pc;t
 (2)
Kt (rt   k (rt   k))+Ntwt (1  n) + pl;txl;t+Mt +Ms;t
Pc;t
:
Pc;t denotes the nominal consumption price. Note that the new monetary injection, Ms;t is
distributed by the government at the beginning of the period as a lump-sum transfer (with the
aggregate money stock given by Ms;t): The cash-in-advance constraint (CIA) states that money
(post-transfer) must be used to buy investment and consumption goods (the associated Lagrange
multiplier is ):
ct + ik;t + ph;tih;t Mt +Ms;t
Pc;t
(3)
The laws of motion for capital and housing are given by (the respective Lagrange multipliers are
 and ):
Kt+1 = Fk (ik;t; ik;t 1) + (1  k)Kt (4)
ht+1 = Fh (ih;t; ih;t 1) + (1  h)ht (5)
Here k and n are the capital income and labor income taxes correspondingly,  represents the
usual capital/housing depreciation rate, pl;txl;t is the value of land, and the function Fj (ij;t; ij;t 1)
accounts investment adjustment cost. According to Christiano et. al (2005), Fj (ij;t; ij;t 1) =
1  S

ij;t
ij;t 1

ij;t, where S(1) = S
0(1) = 0 and S00(1) > 0.
The correspondent Euler equations are:
U1t   t   t = 0
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wtt   U3t = 0
t = Et ((1  k)t+1 + ((1  k) rt+1 + kk)t+1)
t = Et ((1  h) t+1 + U2t+1)
t + t = tFc;1 (ik;t; ik;t 1) + Et (t+1Fc;2 (ik;t+1; ik;t))
ph; t (t + t) = tFh;1 (ih; t; ih; t 1) + Et (t+1Fh;2 (ih; t+1; ih; t))
t
Pc;t
= Et

t+1 + t+1
Pc;t+1

Introducing the nominal interest rate Rt and the shadow prices of the capital and housing
good, qkt and qh;t respectively:
Rt = 1 +
t
t
; t = qk;tU1;t; t = qh;tU1;t
we obtain:
wt
Rt
=
U3t
U1t
(6)
qk;t = Et

(1  k) qk;t+1 + (1  k) rt+1 + kk
Rt+1

U1;t+1
U1;t

(7)
qh;t = Et

(1  h) qh;t+1U1;t+1
U1;t
+
U2;t+1
U1;t

(8)
1 = qk;tFk;1 (ik; t; ik; t 1) + Et

qk;t+1Fk;2 (ik; t+1; ik; t)
U1;t+1
U1;t

(9)
ph; t = qh;tFh;1 (ih; t; ih; t 1) + Et

qh;t+1Fh;2 (ih; t+1; ih; t)
U1;t+1
U1;t

(10)
including the Fisher equation for the nominal interest rate:
1 = RtEt

U1;t+1
(1 + t+1)U1;t

(11)
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where we introduce the ination rate t,
t+1 =
Pc;t+1
Pc;t
  1
The substitution of (3) into (2) and assuming that both constraints are binding, we have our
budget constraint as:
ct+1 + ik;t+1 + ph;t+1ih;t+1 = (12)
Kt ((1  k) rt + kk) +Ntwt (1  n) + pl;txl;t
1 + t+1
+
Ms;t+1
Pc;t+1
2.1.1 Utility function and demand shocks
The utility function is assumed to have the form:
U (c; h; l) =
(cchh l l)1 
1   (13)
where  denotes the coecient of relative risk aversion. The housing demand shock can be added
to the utility function assuming that the parameter h follows the AR(1) processes:
lnh;t+1 = (1  h) ln(0)h + h lnh;t + "h;t+1 (14)
We use, in fact, the same utility function as Devis and Heathcote (2005), but slightly deviate from
them in notation (l 6= 1   c   h;t) to avoid the inuence of housing demand shocks on the
labor supply share l.
2.1.2 Heterogeneous agents, borrowing and collateral constraint at the demand side
As in Iacoviello and Neri (2010), we now introduce two types of agents, patient and impatient. A
prime is used to denote impatient household's parameters and variables (0; N 0 etc.). The patient
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households as described in the previous section have a discount factor that is larger than the
impatient ones,  > 0. While both groups may lend or borrow money, the assumption  > 0
will always lead to the situation where the patient households lend money to the impatient ones.
Adding the borrowing bt to the patient household's budget constraint (2) produce the inequality
(lending corresponds to the negative values of bt):
ct + ik;t + ph;tih;t+
bt 1Rb;t 1
1 + t
+
Mt+1
Pc;t
 (15)
Kt (rt   k (rt   k))+Ntwt (1  n) + pl;txl;t + bt+Mt +Ms;t
Pc;t
In addition to the budget constraint, households face a cash-in-advance constraint:
ct + ik;t + ph;tih;t  Mt +Ms;t
Pc;t
(16)
so, the relation (12) is changed to the form:
ct+1 + ik;t+1 + ph;t+1ih;t+1 = (17)
Kt (rt   k (rt   k))+Ntwt (1  n) + pl;txl;t + bt   Rb;t 1bt 11+t
1 + t+1
+aMms;t+1
where ms;t =
 
Ms;t +M
0
s;t

=Pc;t. The share aM = Ms;t=
 
Ms;t +M
0
s;t

is chosen equal to its
steady-state value and remains constant.
The impatient households have shorter budget constraint, because they don't own capital and
land, so the quantities proportional to Kt, ikt and xlt are omitted:
c0t + ph;ti
0
h;t+
Rb;t 1b0t 1
1 + t
+
M 0t+1
Pc;t
= N 0tw
0
t (1  n) + b0t+
M 0t +M
0
s;t
Pc;t
(18)
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and their CIA constraint is:
c0t + ph;ti
0
h;t 
M 0t +M
0
s;t
Pc;t
(19)
which leads to the combined constraint:
c0t+1 + ph;t+1i
0
h;t+1 =
N 0tw
0
t (1  n) + b0t Rb;t 1b
0
t 1
1+t
1 + t+1
+(1  aM )ms;t+1 (20)
The additional (binding) borrowing constraint for the impatient households (collateral con-
straint) restricts the size of the borrowed funds by the value of their housing stock:
b0t  mEt

ph;t+1 (1 + t+1)h
0
t
Rt

(21)
where m denotes the loan-to-value (LTV) ratio. Iacoviello and Neri (2010) set m for the impatient
fraction of the USA households equal to m = 0:85. In our calibration exercise, we vary in the
range from 0:1 to 0:9 to analyse the eects of m on our economy; m = f0:1; 0:8; 0:85; 0:9g :
The market clearing condition for the borrowing is:
b0t + bt = 0 (22)
The housing stock growth equations for the patient and impatient householders are:
ht+1 + h
0
t+1 = Fh (ih; t; ih;t 1) + Fh
 
i0h; t; i
0
h;t 1

+ (1  h) (ht + h0t) (23)
The patient households maximize their lifetime utility (1) w.r.t. consumption ct, labor hours
Nt, capital Kt and housing ht stocks, the investment into consumption ik;t and housing ih;t
goods sectors, money holdings Mt and borrowing bt subject to constraints (15) and (16), stock
accumulation equation (23) and the capital growth equation (4)
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Their Euler equations consist of system (6) - (11) and the additional equation for the borrowing
interest rate rb;t:
1 = Rb;tEt

Rt
Rt+1
U1;t+1
(1 + t+1)U1;t

(24)
The impatient households maximize their lifetime utility (1) w.r.t. consumption c0t , labor hours
N 0t , housing h
0
t, the investment into housing goods sector i
0
h; t, money holdingsM
0
t and borrowing b
0
t
subject to constraints (18), (19), collateral constraint (21) and the housing accumulation equation
(??). Their Euler equations are:
w0t
R0t
=
U3t
U1t
(25)
1 = 0R0tEt

U1;t+1
(1 + t+1)U1;t

(26)
q0b;tR
0
t = 1  0Rb;tEt

R0t
R0t+1
U1;t+1
(1 + t+1)U1;t

(27)
q0h;t = 
0Et

(1  h) q0h;t+1 + q0b;t+1
b0t+1
h0t+1

U1;t+1
U1;t
+
U2;t+1
U1;t

(28)
ph; t = q
0
h;tFh;1
 
i0h; t; i
0
h;t 1

+ 0Et

q0h;t+1Fh;2
 
i0h; t+ 1; i
0
h;t
U1;t+1
U1;t

(29)
Here q0b;t denotes the shadow price of borrowing. The utility function U = U (c
0
t; 1 N 0t ; h0t) in
equations (25) - (29) depends on the impatient household's consumption c0t, labor hours N
0
t and
housing h0t.
2.2 Production (Firms): with only one household
We rst assume a representative agent framework and then introduce heterogeneous agents as
described above. We assume (as in Davis and Heathcote (2005)) that nal goods (residential
investment and consumption goods) are produced using intermediate goods. The intermediate
goods sector consists of three output: building/construction, manufacture, and services, which
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are produced via Cobb-Douglas production functions:
xi = k
i
i (e
zini)
1 i (30)
where i = b;m; s (building/construction, manufacture, service), kit; nit and zit are capital, house-
hold -, entrepreneur labor, and labor augumenting (in log) productivity shock respectively for
each sector, with the i being the share of capital that dier across sectors. For example, we let in
our calibration that b < m; reecting the fact that the manufacturing sector is more capital in-
tensive (or less labor intensive) than the construction sector. Unlike Davis and Heathcote (2005),
we include entrepreneurial labor supply in the production function.9
The production shocks grows linearly:
zi = t ln gz;i + ~zi (31)
with the stochastic term ~z = (~zb; ~zm; ~zs) following the vector AR(1) process:
~zt+1 = B  ~zt + ~"t+1 (32)
where the the matrix B captures the deterministic part of shocks over time, and the innovation
vector ~" is distributed normally with a given covariance matrix ". The shock growth factors gz;i
lead to the correspondent growth factors for other variables.
These intermediate rms maximize a conventional static prot function at t
max
fkit;nitg
(X
i
pitxit   rtkt   wtnt
)
(33)
9 Although we do not include in the model the entrepreneurial labor income, the assumption of entrepreneurial
labor income is necessary as it gurantees a nonzero net worth for each entrepreneur. This nonzero net worth
assumption is important as the nancial contracting problem is not well dened otherwise. In our calibration
section, we let the share of entrepreneur's labor supply to be quite small but nonzero. Consequently, although the
entreprenuers' labor supply do not play a role in our equilibrium conditions, small share of entrepreneur's labor
supply does ensure a small but nonzero net worth.
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subject to equations kt 
P
i kit; nt 
P
i nit; and non-negativity of inputs, where rt; wt, and pit
are the capital rental, wage, and output prices. A conventional optimization leads to the relations:
kir = ipixi (34)
niw = (1  i) pixi (35)
so that
kir + niw = pixi (36)
The intermediate goods are then used as inputs to produce two nal goods, yj :
yjt = 
i=b;m;s
x1
ij
ijt ; (37)
where j = c; d (consumption/capital investment and residential investment respectively), the input
matrix is dened by
x1 =
0BBBBBB@
bc bd
mc md
sc sd
1CCCCCCA ; (38)
and the shares of construction, manufactures and services for sector j are dened by the matrix
 =
0BBBBBB@
Bc Bd
Mc Md
Sc Sd
1CCCCCCA : (39)
The relative shares of the three intermediate inputs dier in producing two nal goods. For
example, we would set Bc < Bd to represent the fact that the residential investment is more
construction input intensive. Moreover, with the CRS property of the production function, the
14
following conditions must also be satised:
X
i
ij = 1 (40)
and
xit =
X
j
x1ijt (41)
i.e
xbt = bct + bdt; xmt = mct +mdt; xst = sct + sdt: (42)
With intermediate goods as inputs, the nal goods' rms solve the following static prot
maximization problem at t where the price of consumption good, pct; is normalized to 1:
max
fbjt;mjt;sjtg
(
yct + pdtydt  
X
i
pitxit
)
subject to equation (37) and non-negativity of inputs. The optimization of nal good rms leads
to the relations:
pitx1i;jt = i;jpjtyjt (43)
where i = b;m; s, j = c; d
Due to CRS property, we obtain:
X
i=b;m;s
pitxit =
X
j=c;d
pjtyjt = Ktrt + wtNt (44)
where
Kt =
X
i=b;m;s
kit; Nt =
X
i=b;m;s
nit (45)
Lastly, the housing rms (real estate developers or entrepreneurs) produce the housing good,
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yht, given residential investment ydt and x amount of land xlt as inputs, according to
yht = x

lty
1 
dt (46)
where,  denotes the share of land. Output equation (46) will be modied later in the section to
include idiosyncratic productivity and uncertainty shocks. As mentioned in the introduction, the
focus of our paper is on the housing sector in which agency costs with uncertainty and hetroe-
geneity arise: we come back to this modication on the rms' behaviorin the later section. The
optimization denes the price relations:
plxl = phyh; pdyd = (1  )phyh (47)
2.2.1 Firms: Production side with two types of households
With both patient and impatient household, we now need to make small modications of the
production side of the model due to the presence of two types of labor supplying households in
the system. Now the production of the intermediate good (30) changes to the form10:
xi = k
i
i
 
ezinai n
01 
i

1 i (48)
where ni and n
0
i are the hours supplied by the patient and impatient households respectively
accordingly to their labor share . Equations (35) and (36) now are:
niw = pixi (1  i) (49)
n0iw
0 = (1  )pixi (1  i) (50)
10 For the simplicity purpose, we drop the time script in this section.
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and
kir + n
0
iw
0 + niw = pixi: (51)
Balance equations (44) are also changed to:
X
i=b;m;s
pixi =
X
j=c;d
pjyj = Kr +Nw +N
0w0: (52)
The new variable N 0 denotes the total impatient household's hours:
N 0 =
X
i=b;m;s
n0i: (53)
We can introduce now the eective hours L and the eective wage W :
L = NN 01 ; W =
w

 w0
1  
1 
: (54)
Then from relation (49) and (50) follows that
LW = Nw +N 0w0: (55)
We can also introduce the eective hours li = n

i n
01 
i for building, manufacture and services
(i = b;m; s) separately:
li = n

i n
01 
i :
Then the following equations hold:
liW = (1  i) pixi = n0iw0 + niw; L =
X
i=b;m;s
li
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2.3 Credit Channel with Uncertainty
In this section, we outline how the nancial intermediaries decide on the amount of loan that is to
be lend out to housing developers (entrepreneurs). One should note that in our lending model, we
only focuses on the supply side. That is, we do not address the endogenous lending mechanism for
the impatient households (the demand side): The loan for the impatient household is exogenously
determined by the collateral constraint in equation (21).
2.3.1 Housing Entrepreneurial Contract
It is assumed that a continuum of housing producing rms with unit mass are owned by risk-
neutral entrepreneurs (developers). The costs of producing housing are nanced via loans from
risk-neutral intermediaries. Given the realization of the idiosyncratic shock to housing production,
some real estate developers will not be able to satisfy their loan payments and will go bankrupt.
The banks take over operations of these bankrupt rms but must pay an agency fee. These
agency fees, therefore, aect the aggregate production of housing and, as shown below, imply an
endogenous markup to housing prices. That is, since some housing output is lost to agency costs,
the price of housing must be increased in order to cover factor costs.
The timing of events is critical:
1. The exogenous state vector of technology shocks, uncertainty shocks, housing preference
shocks, and monetary shocks, denoted (zi;t; !;t; h;t+1; Rt+1), is realized.
2. Firms hire inputs of labor and capital from households and entrepreneurs and produce
intermediate output via Cobb-Douglas production functions. These intermediate goods are
then used to produce the two nal outputs.
3. Households make their labor, consumption, housing, and investment decisions.
4. With the savings resources from households, the banking sector provide loans to entrepreneurs
via the optimal nancial contract (described below). The contract is dened by the size of
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the loan (fpat) and a cuto level of productivity for the entrepreneurs' technology shock,
!t.
5. Entrepreneurs use their net worth and loans from the banking sector in order to purchase
the factors for housing production. The quantity of factors (residential investment and land)
is determined and paid for before the idiosyncratic technology shock is known.
6. The idiosyncratic technology shock of each entrepreneur is realized. If !at  !t the en-
trepreneur is solvent and the loan from the bank is repaid; otherwise the entrepreneur
declares bankruptcy and production is monitored by the bank at a cost proportional (but
time varying) to total factor payments.
7. Solvent entrepreneur's sell their remaining housing output to the bank sector and use this
income to purchase current consumption and capital. The latter will in part determine their
net worth in the following period.
8. Note that the total amount of housing output available to the households is due to three
sources: (1) The repayment of loans by solvent entrepreneurs, (2) The housing output net of
agency costs by insolvent rms, and (3) the sale of housing output by solvent entrepreneurs
used to nance the purchase of consumption and capital.
A schematic of the implied ows is presented in Figure 2.
For entrepreneur a, the housing production function is denoted G (xalt; yadt) and is assumed
to exhibit constant returns to scale. Specically, we assume:
yaht = !atG (xalt; yadt) = !atx

alty
1 
adt (56)
where,  denotes the share of land. It is assumed that the aggregate quantity of land is xed and
equal to 1. The technology shock, !at, is an idiosyncratic shock aecting real estate developers.
The technology shock is assumed to have a unitary mean and standard deviation of !;t. The
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standard deviation, !;t; follows an AR (1) process:
!;t+1 = 
1 
0 

!;t exp
";t+1 (57)
with the steady-state value 0;  2 (0; 1) and ";t+1 is a white noise innovation.11
Each period, entrepreneurs enter the period with net worth given by nwat: Developers use this
net worth and loans from the banking sector in order to purchase inputs. Letting fpat denote the
factor payments associated with developer a, we have:
fpat = pdtyadt + pltxalt (58)
Hence, the size of the loan is (fpat   nwat) : The realization of !at is privately observed by each
entrepreneur; banks can observe the realization at a cost that is proportional to the total input
bill.
It is convenient to express these agency costs in terms of the price of housing. Note that agency
costs combined with constant returns to scale in housing production (see eq. (56)) implies that
the aggregate value of housing output must be greater than the value of inputs; i.e. housing must
sell at a markup over the input costs, the factor payments. Denote this markup as st (which is
treated as parametric by both lenders and borrowers) which satises:
phtyht = stfpt (59)
Also, since E (!t) = 1 and all rms face the same factor prices, this implies that, at the individual
11 This autoregressive process is used so that, when the model is log- linearized, ^!;t (dened as the percentage
deviations from 0) follows a standard, mean-zero AR(1) process.
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level, we have12
phtG (xalt; yadt) = stfpat (60)
Given these relationships, we dene agency costs for loans to an individual entrepreneur in terms
of foregone housing production as stfpat:
With a positive net worth, the entrepreneur borrows (fpat   nwat) consumption goods and
agrees to pay back
 
1 + rLt

(fpat   nwat) to the lender, where rLt is the interest rate on loans.
The cuto value of productivity, !t, that determines solvency (i.e. !at  !t) or bankruptcy
(i.e. !at < !t) is dened by
 
1 + rLt

(fpat   nwat) = pht!tF () (where F () = F (xalt; yadt)).
Denoting the c:d:f: and p:d:f: of !t as  (!t;!;t) and  (!t;!;t), the expected returns to a
housing producer is therefore given by:13
Z 1
!t

pht!F () 
 
1 + rLt

(fpat   nwat)

 (!;!;t) d! (61)
Using the denition of !t and eq. (60), this can be written as:
stfpatf (!t;!;t) (62)
where f (!t;!;t) is dened as:
f (!t;!;t) =
Z 1
!t
! (!;!;t) d!   [1   (!t;!;t)] !t (63)
Similarly, the expected returns to lenders is given by:
Z !t
0
pht!F () (!;!;t) d! + [1   (!t;!;t)]
 
1 + rLt

(fpat   nwat)  (!t;!;t)stfpat (64)
12 The implication is that, at the individual level, the product of the markup (st) and factor payments is equal
to the expected value of housing production since housing output is unknown at the time of the contract. Since
there is no aggregate risk in housing production, we also have phtyht = stfpt:
13 The notation  (!;!;t) is used to denote that the distribution function is time-varying as determined by the
realization of the random variable, !;t.
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Again, using the denition of !t and eq. (60), this can be expressed as:
stfpatg (!t;!;t) (65)
where g (!t;!;t) is dened as:
g (!t;!;t) =
Z !t
0
! (!;!;t) d! + [1   (!t;!;t)] !t    (!t;!;t) (66)
Note that these two functions sum to:
f (!t;!;t) + g (!t;!;t) = 1   (!t;!;t) (67)
Hence, the term  (!t;!;t) captures the loss of housing due to the agency costs associated
with bankruptcy. With the expected returns to lender and borrower expressed in terms of the
size of the loan, fpat; and the cuto value of productivity, !t; it is possible to dene the optimal
borrowing contract by the pair (fpat; !t) that maximizes the entrepreneur's return subject to the
lender's willingness to participate (all rents go to the entrepreneur). That is, the optimal contract
is determined by the solution to:
max
!t;fpat
stfpatf (!t;!;t) subject to stfpatg (!t;!;t) > fpat   nwat (68)
A necessary condition for the optimal contract problem is given by:
@ (:)
@!t
: stfpat
@f (!t;!;t)
@!t
=  tstfpat @g (!t;!;t)
@!t
(69)
where t is the shadow price of the lender's resources. Using the denitions of f (!t;!;t) and
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g (!t;!;t), this can be rewritten as:
14
1  1
t
=
 (!t;!;t)
1   (!t;!;t) (70)
As shown by eq.(70), the shadow price of the resources used in lending is an increasing function
of the relevant Inverse Mill's ratio (interpreted as the conditional probability of bankruptcy) and
the agency costs. If the product of these terms equals zero, then the shadow price equals the cost
of housing production, i.e. t = 1.
The second necessary condition is:
@ (:)
@fpat
: stf (!t;!;t) = t [1  stg (!t;!;t)] (71)
These rst-order conditions imply that, in general equilibrium, the markup factor, st; will be
endogenously determined and related to the probability of bankruptcy. Specically, using the rst
order conditions, we have that the markup, st; must satisfy:
s 1t =
"
(f (!t;!;t) + g (!t;!;t)) +
 (!t;!;t)f (!t;!;t)
@f(!t;!;t)
@!t
#
(72)
=
266641   (!t;!;t)| {z }
A
   (!t;!;t)
1   (!t;!;t)f (!t;!;t)| {z }
B
37775
which then can be written as
st =
1
1   ($t) + f ($t) '($t)f 0($t)
(73)
We make some brief remarks on the markup equation above. First note that the markup factor
depends only on economy-wide variables so that the aggregate markup factor is well dened. Also,
14 Note that we have used the fact that
@f(!t;!;t)
@!t
= (!t;!;t)  1 < 0
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the two terms, A and B, demonstrate that the markup factor is aected by both the total agency
costs (term A) and the marginal eect that bankruptcy has on the entrepreneur's expected return.
That is, term B reects the loss of housing output, ; weighted by the expected share that would
go to entrepreneur's, f (!t;!;t) ; and the conditional probability of bankruptcy (the Inverse Mill's
ratio). Finally, note that, in the absence of credit market frictions, there is no markup so that
st = 1. In the partial equilibrium setting, it is straightforward to show that equation (72) denes
an implicit function ! (st; !;t) that is increasing in st.
The incentive compatibility constraint implies
fpat =
1
(1  stg (!t;!;t))nwat (74)
Equation (74) implies that the size of the loan is linear in entrepreneur's net worth so that
aggregate lending is well-dened and a function of aggregate net worth.
The eect of an increase in uncertainty on lending can be understood in a partial equilibrium
setting where st and nwat are treated as parameters. As shown by eq. (72), the assumption that
the markup factor is unchanged implies that the costs of default, represented by the terms A and
B, must be constant. With a mean-preserving spread in the distribution for !t, this means that
!t will fall (this is driven primarily by the term A). Through an approximation analysis, it can
be shown that !t  g (!t;!;t) (see the Appendix in Dorofeenko, Lee, and Salyer (2008)). That
is, the increase in uncertainty will reduce lenders' expected return (g (!t;!;t)). Rewriting the
binding incentive compatibility constraint (eq. (74)) yields:
stg (!t;!;t) = 1  nwat
fpat
(75)
the fall in the left-hand side induces a fall in fpat. Hence, greater uncertainty results in a fall in
housing production. This partial equilibrium result carries over to the general equilibrium setting.
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The existence of the markup factor implies that inputs will be paid less than their marginal
products. In particular, prot maximization in the housing development sector implies the fol-
lowing necessary conditions:
plt
pht
=
Gxl (xlt; ydt)
st
(76)
pdt
pht
=
Gyd (xlt; ydt)
st
(77)
These expressions demonstrate that, in equilibrium, the endogenous markup (determined by the
agency costs) will be a determinant of housing prices.
The production of new housing is determined by a Cobb-Douglas production with residential
investment and land (xed in equilibrium) as inputs. Denoting housing output, net of agency
costs, as yht; this is given by:
yht = x

lty
1 
dt [1   (!t;!;t)] (78)
In equilibrium, we require that iht = yht; i.e. household's housing investment is equal to housing
output. Recall that the law of motion for housing is given by eq. (5)
2.3.2 Entrepreneurial Consumption and House Prices
To rule out self-nancing by the entrepreneur (i.e. which would eliminate the presence of agency
costs), it is assumed that the entrepreneur discounts the future at a faster rate than the patient
household. This is represented by following expected utility function:
E0
P1
t=0 ()
t
cet (79)
where cet denotes entrepreneur's per-capita consumption at date t; and  2 (0; 1) : This new
parameter, , will be chosen so that it osets the steady-state internal rate of return due to
housing production.
25
Each period, entrepreneur's net worth, nwt is determined by the value of capital income and
the remaining capital stock.15 That is, entrepreneurs use capital to transfer wealth over time
(recall that the housing stock is owned by households). Denoting entrepreneur's capital as ket , this
implies:16
nwt = k
e
t [rt + 1  ] (80)
The law of motion for entrepreneurial capital stock is determined in two steps. First, new
capital is nanced by the entrepreneurs' value of housing output after subtracting consumption:
ket+1 = phtyahtf (!t;!;t)  cet = stfpatf (!t;!;t)  cet (81)
Note we have used the equilibrium condition that phtyaht = stfpat to introduce the markup,
st, into the expression. Then, using the incentive compatibility constraint, eq. (74), and the
denition of net worth, the law of motion for capital is given by:
ket+1 = k
e
t (rt + 1  )
stf (!t;!;t)
1  stg (!t;!;t)   c
e
t (82)
The term stf (!t;!;t) = (1  stg (!t;!;t)) represents the entrepreneur's internal rate of return
due to housing production; alternatively, it reects the leverage enjoyed by the entrepreneur since
stf (!t;!;t)
1  stg (!t;!;t) =
stfpatf (!t;!;t)
nwt
(83)
That is, entrepreneurs use their net worth to nance factor inputs of value fpat; this produces
housing which sells at the markup st with entrepreneur's retaining fraction f (!t;!;t) of the value
of housing output.
15 As stated in footnote 6, net worth is also a function of current labor income so that net worth is bounded
above zero in the case of bankruptcy. However, since entrepreneur's labor share is set to a very small number, we
ignore this component of net worth in the exposition of the model.
16 For expositional purposes, in this section we drop the subscript a denoting the individual entrepreneur.
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Given this setting, the optimal path of entrepreneurial consumption implies the following Euler
equation:
1 = Et

(rt+1 + 1  ) st+1 f (!t+1;!;t+1)
1  st+1g (!t+1;!;t+1)

(84)
Finally, we can derive an explicit relationship between entrepreneur's capital and the value of
the housing stock using the incentive compatibility constraint and the fact that housing sells at
a markup over the value of factor inputs. That is, since phtF (xalt; yadt) = stfpt, the incentive
compatibility constraint implies:
pht

xlty
1 
dt

= ket
(rt + 1  )
1  stg (!t;!;t) st (85)
Again, it is important to note that the markup parameter plays a key role in determining housing
prices and output.
2.3.3 Financial Intermediaries
The Capital Mutual Funds (CMFs) act as risk-neutral nancial intermediaries who earn no prot
and produce neither consumption nor capital goods. There is a clear role for the CMF in this
economy since, through pooling, all aggregate uncertainty of capital (house) production can be
eliminated. The CMF receives capital from three sources: entrepreneurs sell undepreciated capital
in advance of the loan, after the loan, the CMF receives the newly created capital through loan
repayment and through monitoring of insolvent rms, and, nally, those entrepreneur's that are
still solvent, sell some of their capital to the CMF to nance current period consumption. This
capital is then sold at the price of st units of consumption to households for their investment
plans.
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2.4 Government budget constraint
Assuming the absence of government money holdings, its budget constraint equation is:
Gt +  ($t) ph;tyh;t +ms;t+m
0
s;t = (86)
Kt (rt   k) k+(Ntwt +N 0tw0t) n+mGt
where Gt denotes the real government spending, ms;t=Mst=Pc;t;m
0
s;t = M
0
t=Pc;t; and m
G
t =
MGt =Pc;t and M
G
t is a lump-sum money injection into the whole economy. Here we let the money
evolves according to
mGt+1 = (1  M )mG0 + MmGt
where, M 2 (0; 1).
Following Christiano, Eichenbaum and Trabandt (2014), we use the monetary policy rule as:
log

Rb;t+1
Rb

= %R log

Rb;t
Rb

+(1  %R)

% log

1 + t+1
1 + 

+ %gdp log

GDPt+1
GDP

+ %gdp log

GDPt+1
GDPt

+"R;t+1
(87)
We also use one-period log-dierence for GDP instead of averaged four-period dierence used by
Christiano et al, (2014).17
We assume here that the monitoring of defaulting rms is arranged by a government's insti-
tution, but separate the monitoring cost  ($t) ph;tyh;t from the other government spendings
as each deafulting rms belong to dierent industries (see eqs (89) and (90) below). The share
of government spendings Gt=GDPt = aG is considered to be a xed value according to Davis
and Heathcote (2005) (see eq (91)). The government distributes money injections Mst and M
0
st
between the patient and impatient householders proportionally to their steady-state shares M0
17 Equation (87) contains variables with exponential trend removed. The variables without subscript denote
steady-state values. We use \borrowing interest rate" of borrowing between patient and impatient households, Rb
, in eq (87) as one of the targeted values.
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and M 00:
The complete system of 62 equilibrium equations of the model is summarized in the Appendix.
3 Empirical Results
Our primary empirical objective in this paper is to show the importance of the following key
parameters (variables) and shocks on housing variables as well as some of the aggregate macro
variables. Consequently, we do not calibrate our model to specic country's economic parameters,
but rather we set the model parameters to our benchmark values of the U.S. economy but with
the loan-to-value (m) to to vary to reect dierent european countries situation. Most of the
parameters are based on three sources: Davis and Healthcote (2004), Iacoviello and Neri (2010)
and Dorofeenko, Lee and Salyer (2014). Some of the other key parameters that need further
explanation are described below. In this section, we do not address some of the housing and
business cycles: we do discuss in this paper version, the steady-state, and some of the second
moment properties of the model to the data. We, however, focus our results on the dynamics of
the model by analyzing impulse response functions and variance decompositions.
3.1 Calibration Parameters
We use linear approximation approach to calibrate our model. As mentioned above, we employ
our parameters based on the U.S. and various European nations (average values) dataset. We
do not claim that the parameters that we employ in this section reect the true nature of the
European economies that we have in mind. For example, the bankrupcy rates across dierent
nations vary as each economy has a dierent set of bankruptcy laws and rules. Nevertheless,
during our calibration excercise, we have checked the robustness of several of the paramameter
that we thought would lead to an unstable equilibrium case. The parameters that we have nally
decided to use do not change much of the empirical results that we are to report in the next
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section. The crucial parameter that we use to distinguish three dierent European economies of
Germany, Italy, and Spain, we assign the LTV ratio, m; f0:80; 0:85; 0:90g 18 respectively.
A strong motivation for using the Davis and Heathcote (2005) model is that the theoretical
constructs have empirical counterparts. Hence, the model parameters can be calibrated to the
data. We use directly the parameter values chosen by the previous authors; readers are directed to
their paper for an explanation of their calibration methodology. Parameter values for preferences,
depreciation rates, population growth and land's share are presented in Table 1. In addition, the
parameters for the intermediate production technologies are presented in Table 2.19
As in Davis and Heathcote (2005), the exogenous shocks to productivity in the three sectors
are assumed to follow an autoregressive process as given in eq. (??). The parameters for the
vector autoregression are the same as used in Davis and Heathcote (2005) (see their Table 4, p.
766 for details). In particular, we use the following values (recall that the rows of the B matrix
correspond to the building, manufacturing, and services sectors, respectively):
B =
0BBBBBB@
0:707 0:010  0:093
 0:006 0:871  0:150
0003 0:028 0:919
1CCCCCCA
18 We also include the LTV of 0.1 (m = 0:1) to reect almost no LTV constraint.
19 Davis and Heathcote (2005) determine the input shares into the consumption and residential investment good
by analyzing the two sub-tables contained in the \Use" table of the 1992 Benchmark NIPA Input-Output tables.
Again, the interested reader is directed to their paper for further clarication.
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Table 1: Key Preference, lending and Production Parameters
Notation Value Description
br 0.039 Bankruptcy rate
m0 0.00868 steady state value of money supply
rp 0.0187 risk premium
a 0.9 patient HH's labor share
b 0.93 impatient HH's discount rate
 0.951 patient household discount factor
 0.825 extra entrepr discount factor
 1.017 population growth rate
0 0.02 inflation rate
0 0.231 st.dev.of entrepreneurial !
 0.106 land share in housing production
 0.001 persistency of 
!0 0.648 steady-state.of !
aG 0.01 gorevnment consump.share of GDP
k 0.0557 capital depreciation rate
s 0.0157 res. structure depreciation rate
h 0.014 housing stock depreciation rate
b 0.106 construction capital share
m 0.33 manufacturing capital share
s 0.248 services capital share
h 3. housing investment adjustment cost
k 3. capital investment adjustment cost
c 0.314 cons.easticity in utility function
h 0.0444 housing easticity in utility function
` 0.642 leisure easticity in utility function
h 0.25 monitoring cost
%gdp 0.012 TR persistency of GDP
% 1.672 TR persistency of inflation
%R 0.792 TR persistency of interest rate
%gdp 0.184 TR persistency of GDP change
%h 0.96 persistency of housing demand shock
%m 0.9 persistency of money
gz;b 0.997 construction productivity growth rate
gz;m 1.028 manufacturing productivity growth rate
gz;s 1.016 services productivity growth rate
Table 2: Intermediate Production Technology Parameters
B M S
Input shares for consumption/investment good (Bc;Mc; Sc) 0.031 0.270 0.700
Input shares for residential investment (Bd;Md; Sd) 0.470 0.238 0.292
Capital's share in each sector (b; m; s) 0.132 0.309 0.237
Sectoral trend productivity growth (%) (gzb; gzm; gzs) -0.27 2.85 1.65
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Note this implies that productivity shocks have modest dynamic eects across sectors. The con-
temporaneous correlations of the innovations to the shock are given by the correlation matrix:
 =
0BBBBBB@
Corr ("b; "b) Corr ("b; "m) Corr ("b; "s)
Corr ("m; "m) Corr ("m; "s)
Corr ("s; "s)
1CCCCCCA =
0BBBBBB@
1 0:089 0:306
1 0:578
1
1CCCCCCA
The standard deviations for the innovations were assumed to be: (bb; mm; ss) = (0.041, 0.036,
0.018).
For the nancial sector, we use the same loan and bankruptcy rates as in Carlstrom and Fuerst
(1997) in order to calibrate the steady-state value of !t, denoted $; and the steady-state standard
deviation of the entrepreneur's technology shock, 0. The average spread between the prime and
commercial paper rates is used to dene the average risk premium (rp) associated with loans to
entrepreneurs as dened in Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997); this average spread is 1:87% (expressed
as an annual yield). The steady-state bankruptcy rate (br) is given by  ($;0) and Carlstrom
and Fuerst (1997) used the value of 3.9% (again, expressed as an annual rate). This yields two
equations which determine ($;0):
20
 ($;0) = 3:90
$
g ($;0)
  1 = 1:87 (88)
yielding $  0:65, 0  0:23.21
20 Note that the risk premium can be derived from the markup share of the realized output and the amount of pay-
ment on borrowing: st!tfpt = (1 + rp) (fpt   nwt) : And using the optimal factor payment (project investment),
fpt; in equation (74), we arrive at the risk premium in equation (88).
21 It is worth noting that, using nancial data, Gilchrist et al. (2008) estimate 0 to be equal to 0.36. Moreover,
Chugh (2016) using industry level data estimates 0 to be exactly 0.23.
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The entrepreneurial discount factor  can be recovered by the condition that the steady-state
internal rate of return to the entrepreneur is oset by their additional discount factor:


sf ($;0)
1  sg ($;0)

= 1
and using the mark-up equation for s in eq. (72), the parameter  then satises the relation
 =
gU
gK

1 +
 ($;0)
f 0 ($;0)

 0:832
where, gU is the growth rate of marginal utility and gK is the growth rate of consumption (identical
to the growth rate of capital on a balanced growth path). The autoregressive parameter for the
risk shocks, , is set to 0.90 so that the persistence is roughly the same as that of the productivity
shocks.
The nal two parameters are the adjustment cost parameters (k; h) : In their analysis of
quarterly U.S. business cycle data, Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005) provide estimates
of k for dierent variants of their model which range over the interval (0:91; 3:24) (their model
did not include housing and so there was no estimate for h). Since our empirical analysis involves
annual data, we choose a lower value for the adjustment cost parameter and, moreover, we impose
the restriction that k = h. We assume that h = h = 3 implying that the (short-run) elasticity
of investment and housing with respect to a change in the respective shadow prices is 0.33 (i.e. the
inverse of the adjustment cost parameter). Given the estimates in Christiano, Eichenbaum, and
Evans (2005), we think that these values are certainly not extreme. We also solve the model with
no adjustment costs. As discussed below, the presence of adjustment costs improves the behavior
of the model in several dimensions.
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3.1.1 Estimation of Risk Shocks
In this section, we estimate risk shocks using the U.S. construction rm level data. The main
purpose in estimating these shocks is to show that risk shocks dened as the time variation in
the cross sectional distribution of rm level productivities are important inputs to a baseline
DSGE model. In estimating risk shocks, we use the dataset from the Compustat Industry Specic
Quarterly data. For the robustness of our estimation, we estimate for 2 intersecting subsets of
rms: i). The rms with S&P GIC sub-industry code 25201030 { Homebuilding (47 rms); ii). The
rms with NAICS sub-industry code 23611 (sub-industries 236115-236118) - Residential Building
Construction (35 rms)22.
The procedure we employ in estimating our risk shocks is similar to Chugh (2011), who uses the
dataset of Cooper and Haltiwanger's (2006) U.S. manufacturing dataset. In order to estimate the
risk shocks, we rst need to estimate the rm-level productivity coecients via Fama-MacBeth
regression as follows: employing the usual Cobb-Douglas production Bit = cm

itl
1 
it exp ("it) ;
where i and t denote rm and time , Bit is the Backlogs, i.e., the \dollar value of housing units
subject to pending sales contracts" to proxy output, lit is \Land under development",mit is dened
as \Homebuilding inventories Total" - \Land under development" - \Undeveloped inventories
owned" and "it iid with Normal. Taking the log of the production function, we estimate following
regression:
log

Bit
lit

= c+  log

mit
lit

+ "it
Given the dataset, the term Bitlit represents the "prot or productivity" and the term
mit
lit
denotes the input. The estimates of  for subset (1) and subset (2) are 1 = 0:6 (0:05) and
2 = 0:7 (0:04) respectively with the standard deviations in brackets. With the estimates b; the
logarithmic productivity is then dened as the residual:
22 The full description of these NAICS codes are as follows: 23611 Residential Building Construction, 236115 New
Single-Family Housing Construction (except Operative Builders), 236116 New Multifamily Housing Construction
(except Operative Builders), 236117 New Housing Operative Builders, and 236118 Residential Remodelers.
34
log (Pit) = log

Bit
lit

  b logmit
lit

where, the aggregate productivity is dened as Pt  1N
NtP
i=1
Pit and idiosyncratic productivity
as pit  PitPt (with 1Nt
NtP
i=1
pit = 1). Consequently, the risk is estimated as cross-sectional standard
deviation of pit : that is,
t =
vuut 1
N
NtX
i=1
(pit   1)2 :
Finally, the AR(1) estimates of HP-detrended risk t; log (t) =  log (t 1) + "t where "t 
N
 
0; 2

; that we use as our input to our model yield i) for the subset 1,  = 0:28(0:17) and
 = 0:23(0:02); and ii) for the subset 2,  = 0:26(0:19) and  = 0:24(0:03), where the numbers in
brackets indicate the standard deviations. Moreover, the corresponding annual value for y  0:02
and y  0:01:
Figure 3 shows the estimated productivity and risk shocks from 2001 till 2011. The HP trends
for productivity and risk shocks clearly show that the shocks behave opposite: one can think of
risk (uncertainty) shocks as "negative" technology shocks in terms of the role the shocks play in
our model. These strongly countercyclical construction rm level risk is also a robust nding in
micro evidence of Bachmann and Bayer (2010) and Bloom, Floetotto, and Jaimovich (2010).
3.2 Dynamics
3.2.1 Loan-to-Value Eect and Various Shocks: Impulse Response Functions
The main questions to be addressed in this sections are as follows: i) How do non-standard shocks
in relation to the technology shocks eect key housing and macroeconomic variables? ii) How does
the collateral constraint on some of the households eect the housing and business cycles?
Figures 4, 5 and 6 show the impulse response functions (to a 1% innovation in all four shocks)
for several macroeconomic and housing variables under one key parameter value23: the LTV
23 We also have analysed two other parameter dimensions: the monitoring cost (reecting the agency cost) and
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ratio, which is set to either 0.1 or 0.85. A few papers have investigated the role of collateral
requirements for the transmission of unanticipated shocks and macroeconomic volatility. Campbell
and Hercowitz (2004) nd that the U.S. mortgage market liberalization of the early 1990s, proxied
by an increase in the LTV ratio, played a role in explaining the great moderation. In contrast,
Calza, Monacelli and Stracca (2010) show that the transmission of monetary policy shocks to
consumption, investment and house prices is dampened by lower LTV ratio. While the results
discussed above provide some support for the housing cum credit channel model, the role of the
lending channel with collateral constraint is not easily seen because of the presence of the other
impulse shocks (i.e., the sectoral productivity shocks).
We rst turn to the behavior of three key macroeconomic variables, namely GDP, household
consumption (denoted PCE), and total capital when the LTV is set to 10% (m=01) and 85%
(m=0.85) as seen in Figures 4a and 4b. The response to a technology shock to the construction
sector has the predicted eect that GDP increases. Consumption also increases, while capital
stock responds much bigger. This consumption/savings decision reects agents response to the
expected high productivity (due to the persistence of the shock) in the construction sector. Turning
to our a risk shock which aects housing production results, we see a modest fall in GDP and
in capital stock. Recall, as discussed in the partial equilibrium analysis of the credit channel
model, an increase in productivity risk results in a leftward shift in the supply of housing; since
residential investment (and hence, the capital stock) is the primary input into housing, it too falls
in response to the increased risk. Consumption reacts negatively to a risk shock due to an increas
in "pre-cautionary savings" as households face the persistence of the shock.
Consumption responds positively to both technology and monetary shocks, which is consistent
with models that have an investment specic technology shock (e.g. Greenwood, Hercowitz, and
Krusell (2000)). The monetary shocks play a large role in the aforementioned variables: the
capital adjustment cost (reecting the amplitude of business cycles). The results are not shown as we focus on the
eects of the LTV parameter.
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magnitude of the monetary shock is as big as the technology shocks if not bigger.
Figure 5 reports the impulse response functions of the housing markup, the risk premium
on loans to the housing producers and the bankruptcy rate. A positive technology shock to the
construction sector increases the demand for housing and, ceteris paribus, will result in an increase
in the price of housing. This will result in greater lending to the housing producers which will
result in a greater bankruptcy rate and risk premium; both of these eects imply that the housing
markup will increase. Note the counterfactual implication that both the bankruptcy rate and
the risk premium on loans will be procyclical; this was also the case in the original Carlstrom
and Fuerst (1997) model and for exactly the same reason. In contrast, a risk shock produces
countercyclical behavior in these three variables. Hence, this argues for inclusion of risk shocks as
an important impulse mechanism in the economy. With the preference shocks, both the housing
markup and risk premium react positively as expected: as the demand increase, there is a greater
incentive for the housing developers to a higher markup, which then creates an upper pressure
on the risk premium. The monetary shocks eect on the housing markup is something that we
cannot logically explain.
Finally, we report in Figure 6, the impulse response functions of the prices of land,housing
and the amount of borrowing to the four shocks. A technology shock to the construction sector
results in lower cost of housing inputs due to the increased output in residential investment so
that the price of housing falls. However, the price of land, i.e. the xed factor, increases. For
an uncertainty (risk), preference and monetary shocks, the resulting fall in the supply of housing
causes the demand for the xed factor (land) to fall and the price of the nal good (housing)
to increase. In regards to the borrowing, we clearly see the role of monetary shock: 1% changes
in interest rate causes 0.2% decrease in the amount of borrowing. The monetary shock has the
biggest eect of all the shocks that are presented.
In ending this section, a word of caution is needed in interpreting the quantitative magnitudes
seen in the impulse response functions. In particular, note that the response of housing prices to a
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Table 3: Variance Decomposition of Forecast Error
Variance of Decomposition
ub u uh uR
Shocks tech risk preference monetary
GDP 0.87 0.016 0.027 0.086
PCE 0.46 0.069 0.03 0.44
capital stock 0.54 0.007 0.01 0.44
house stock patient 0.55 0.022 0.044 0.38
house stock impatient 0.50 0.0039 0.029 0.465
Labor Hour (total) 0.49 0.062 0.049 0.40
Borrowing 0.495 0.0016 0.023 0.48
House Price 0.026 0.854 0.065 0.05
House Investment 0.148 0.085 0.037 0.735
preference shock increase is greater than the response due to, say, a risk shock or monetary shock.
One might deduce that the housing sector and risks and monetary shocks play a minor role in
the movement of housing prices. As the results from the full model (i.e. when the all technology,
monetary and risk shocks are present) imply, such a conclusion would be incorrect.
3.2.2 What drives housing and business cycles? Variance Decompositions
This section briey describes the role of various shocks on some of the key macro and housing
variables. The main message from Table 3 is that the monetary and uncertainty shocks play a
major role in accounting for the movements in some of the aggregate as well as housing variables.
In other words, there is a large of policy makers in dealing with the volatilities of these afore-
mentioned variables. On the other hand, the preference shocks play almost no role in any of the
macro or housing variables.
Once again, Table 3 presents three dierent scenarios that are based on LTV ratio: low (80),
middle (85) and high (90) borrowing constraints. Unlike some of the recent literature that em-
phasize the important role of the level of LTV on housing market, our results indicate otherwise:
almost no dierences between dierent levels of LTV on the variables that we analyze. On the role
of specic shocks, Table 3 shows that the eects of monetary shocks are huge on most of the macro
38
variables and in particular on the housing investment and the amount of borrowing the households
undertake: over 75 percent and almost 50 percent of the variation in housing investment and bor-
rowing can be explained by the monetary shocks. On the contrary to monetary shocks, housing
demand shocks have a trivial impact on all the variables that we analyze: at most 6 percent of
the variation in housing price can be explained by the preference shocks. Lastly, our endogenous
debt nancial accelerator model with risk shocks lends a strong support for the important role of
risk shocks: over 85 percent of the variation in housing price is due to risk shocks.
4 Some Final Remarks
Our primary ndings fall into two broad categories. First, risk and monetary shocks to the housing
producing sector imply a quantitatively large role for uncertainty and monetary policy over the
housing and business cycles. Second, there is a great role for the government policies: the eects
of both monetary and risk shocks clearly show that having a stable economy can indeed reduce
the volatilities of various housing and macroeconomic variables.
For future research, modelling uncertainty due to time variation in the types of entrepreneurs
would be fruitful. One possibility would be an economy with a low risk agent whose productivity
shocks exhibit low variance and a high risk agent with a high variance of productivity shocks.
Because of restrictions on the types of nancial contracts that can be oered, the equilibrium
is a pooling equilibrium so that the same type of nancial contract is oered to both types of
agents. Hence the aggregate distribution for technology shocks hitting the entrepreneurial sector
is a mixture of the underlying distributions for each type of agent. Our conjecture is that this
form of uncertainty has important quantitative predictions and, hence, could be an important
impulse mechanism in the credit channel literature that, heretofore, has been overlooked. It also
anecdotally corresponds with explanations for the cause of the current credit crisis: a substantial
fraction of mortgage borrowers had higher risk characteristics than originally thought.
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Moreover, our current model is silent about the optimal loan contract between the impatient
households and nancial intermediaries. Developing an endogenous household loan model would
further shed light on the latest housing and nancial boom and bust cycles. A quantitative
assessment of the relative importance of the role of monetary policy, as well as the analysis of the
optimal conduct of monetary policy, is also left to future research.
Nevertheless, from our analysis, there is a clear and important role for the policy makers to
smooth housing price and/or housing investment. The fact that both monetary and uncertainty
shocks play a prominent role in explaining the housing and macro business cycles, the monetary
policymakers have two instruments on hand to calm markets and provide market codence. How-
ever, one should be cautious in interpreting our empirical results as evidence for policymakers to
be directly involved in solving nancial and housing problems.
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5 Appendix
5.1 Recent Developments in European Housing Markets: Some Facts
In this section, we briey discuss some of the recent housing and macroeconomics development for
the aforementioned European countries. We start with the supply side by discussing the residential
investment, and then focus on the demand side factors: i) household debt for housing loan, ii)
borrowing factors; interest rate and loan-to-value.
Residential Investments
Figure 7 shows that residential investment moves in tandem to house prices to a various degree
across countries. Starting with nations that face fairly elastic housing supply, between 1997 and
2007, Spain, Ireland, and Greece's residential investments approximately increased 120, 80 and 70
percent respectively. For Italy and the average EU (15), increases in residential investment have
been more modest, despite large house price increases, suggesting that supply is fairly inelastic in
these countries. for Germany, residential investment has been stagnating or falling, but as in the
housing price movement, the residential investment has been slightly increasing as of 2009.
Household Debt
Figure 8 shows the household's long term loan for house purchase. There is a clear correlation
between the movements in house prices, residential investment and household debt across the
nations. With the rapid rising in house prices for some of the European nations and with an easy
access to credit24, Figure 3 illustrates some of the dramatic increase in the level of household debt
(measured by the long term loan for house purchase) over recent years. Except for Germany, the
household debt for the rest of the nations have been rapidly increasing over the last few years.
Greece leads the pack with being the most indebted amount, followed by Ireland. An interesting
aspect from gure 4 is that Ireland is the only nation that shows the downturn on the amount of
24 Recent product innovations including low and exible mortgage rate products, which are essentially aimed at
restoring housing aordability in the face of rising prices, are well documented for the European countries (e.g.
ECB, 2009).
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Table 4: Long-run Eects of Uncertainty, Bartik and Interaction term
Country Predominant Interest Rate Type Typical Loan Term (years) Main Lenders Source
Australia variable 25 Banks and nonbank specialist "mortgage originators" ECB
Austria xed 25-30 Banks and Bausparkassen (mainly savings banks) ECB
Belgium xed 20 Banks ECB
Canada mixed 25-35 Banks and specialized nondepository mortgage brokers ECB
Denmark mixed 30 Mortgage and retails banks ECB
France xed 15-20 Mortgage and retails banks ECB
Germany xed 20-30 Banks and Bausparkassen (mainly savings banks) ECB
Ireland variable 21-35 Banks, building societies and mortgage brokers ECB
Italy mixed 20 Banks ECB
Japan mixed 20-30 Banks and specialized mortgage institutions ECB
Netherlands xed 30 Banks and mortgage banks and brokers ECB
Portugal variable 25-35 Banks ECB
Spain variable 30 Banks (commercial and savings) ECB
Sweden variable 30-45 Bank and mortgage institutions ECB
UK variable 25 Banks, building societies and mortgage brokers ECB
US xed 30 Banks and mortgage brokers ECB
Source: The report "Housing and Finance in the Euro Area, March 2009", Table 3.2, from the
European Central Bank.
household debt. Italy and Portugal show that their household debts are increasing whereby Spain
and Greece are leveling o.25 High levels of household debt clearly open up the vulnerability of
households welfare to changes and shocks to mortgage payments, personal disposable income, and
especially to house prices.
Interest rates
Figure 9 shows European mortgage interest rates (both real and nominal) have come down
considerably from early 1990 till mid 2005: the average nominal rate for the European nations
decreased from 12 to 4.5 percent. As can be seen in gure 4, except for Germany, the sample
country's rates have been increasing from 2005 till their peak at late 2008. Subsequently, due to
various economic downturns in these countries, the rates have been again falling below the 2005
rates. Table 4 shows the loan types for various European and North America nations.
Loan-to-Value
25 If one looks at the average household debt, of which mortgages are the main constituent, represented about
one year of household disposable income in 1995. By 2000, debt had risen to about 120% and in 2007 it was close
to 170% for the Euro zone countries (OECD, 2010).
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Table 5: Loan to Value Ratios
Country LTV Source
Australia 90-100 ECB
Austria 80 ECB
Belgium 100 ECB
Canada 80 ECB
Denmark 80 ECB
France 100 ECB
Germany 80 ECB
Ireland 100+ ECB
Italy 80 ECB
Japan 70-80 ECB
Netherlands 125 ECB
Portugal 90 ECB
Spain 100 ECB
Sweden 80-95 ECB
UK 110 ECB
US 110+ ECB
Note: The column LTV refers to the maximum LTV on New Loans. Source: The "Housing and
Finance in the Euro Area, March 2009"",Table 3.2, from the European Central Bank.
IMF (2011) reports that there has been a sharp increase in the loan-to-value ratios : during
the latest housing upturn, limits on the amount of mortgages have become less stringent than in
the past in many markets. Maximum loan-to-value ratios have generally exceeded 80% in OECD
countries. According to Table 3.2 in ECB (2009), Table 5 shows the maximum Loan to Value
ratios on new loans for Germany, Italy, Ireland, Portugal and Spain are 80, 80, 100+, 90, and 100
respectively.
5.2 Complete set of equations of the model
The complete system of 62 equilibrium equations of the model is summarized below.
5.2.1 Household Sectors: 19 Equations ( patient and impatient households)
Patient households (8 equations) The household's modied budget constraint (17)
ct+1+ik;t+1+ph;t+1ih;t+1 =
Kt (rt   k (rt   k)) +Ntwt (1  n) + pl;txl;t + bt  Rb;t 1bt 1
1 + t+1
+aMms;t+1
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Euler equations for the patient household (6) - (11), (24) - (29)
wt
Rt
=
U3t
U1t
qk;t = Et

(1  k) qk;t+1 + (1  k) rt+1 + kk
Rt+1

U1;t+1
U1;t

qh;t = Et

(1  h) qh;t+1U1;t+1
U1;t
+
U2;t+1
U1;t

1 = qk;tFk;1 (ik; t; ik; t 1) + Et

qk;t+1Fk;2 (ik; t+1; ik; t)
U1;t+1
U1;t

ph; t = qh;tFh;1 (ih; t; ih; t 1) + Et

qh;t+1Fh;2 (ih; t+1; ih; t)
U1;t+1
U1;t

1 = RtEt

U1;t+1
(1 + t+1)U1;t

1 = Rb;tEt

Rt
Rt+1
U1;t+1
U1;t

Impatient Households (7 equations) The household's modied budget constraint (20),
c0t+1 + ph;t+1i
0
h;t+1 =
N 0tw
0
t (1  n) + b0t  Rb;t 1b0t 1
1 + t+1
+
M 0s;t+1
Pc;t+1
collateral borrowing constraint (21),
b0t  mEt

ph;t+1h
0
t
Rt

Euler equations:
w0t
R0t
=
U3t
U1t
1 = 0R0tEt

U1;t+1
(1 + t+1)U1;t

q0b;tR
0
t = 1  0Rb;tEt

R0t
R0t+1
U1;t+1
U1;t

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q0h;t = 
0Et

(1  h) q0h;t+1 + q0b;t+1
b0t+1
h0t+1

U1;t+1
U1;t
+
U2;t+1
U1;t

ph; t = q
0
h;tFh;1
 
i0h; t; i
0
h;t 1

+ 0Et

q0h;t+1Fh;2
 
i0h; t+ 1; i
0
h;t
U1;t+1
U1;t

Debt market clearing condition (22): 1 equation
b0t + bt = 0
Capital growth: 3 equations
ht+1 = Fh (ih; t; ih;t 1) + (1  h)ht
h0t+1= Fh
 
i0h; t; i
0
h;t 1

+ (1  h)h0t
Kt+1 = Fk (ik;t; ik;t 1) + (1  k)Kt
5.2.2 Entrepreneur equations: 4 Equations
The entrepreneur equations include
1 = Et

(rt+1 + 1  ) st+1 f (!t+1;!;t+1)
1  st+1g (!t+1;!;t+1)

st =
1
1   ($t) + f ($t) '($t)f 0($t)
pht

xlty
1 
dt

= ket
(rt + 1  )
1  stg (!t;!;t) st
ket+1 = k
e
t (rt + 1  )
stf (!t;!;t)
1  stg (!t;!;t)   c
e
t
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5.2.3 Production side equations: 29 Equations for (i = b;m; s; j = c; d)
The production side equations are
xi =
X
j=c;d
x1i;j
yj =
Y
i=fb;m;sg
x1
i;j
i;j
pix1i;j = i;jpjyj
K =
X
i=b;m;s
ki; N =
X
i=b;m;s
ni
yh = x

l y
1 
d
plxl = phyh; pdyd = (1  )phyh
xi = k
i
i
 
ezinai n
01 a
i

1 i
niw = apixi (1  i)
n0iw
0 = (1  a)pixi (1  i)
kir + n
0
iw
0 + niw = pixi
N 0 =
X
i=b;m;s
n0i
5.2.4 Resource constraints: 2 equations
Gt + ct+c
0
t + c
e
t + ik;t = yc;t (89)
ih;t + i
0
h;t = yh;t (1   ($t)) (90)
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5.2.5 Goverment constraints: 2 equations
The real government spending Gt satises budget constraint equation and is assumed to be pro-
portional to the real GDP:
Gt +  ($t) ph;tyh;t+
Mst +M
0
st
Pc;t
=
Kt (rt   k) k+(Ntwt +N 0tw0t) n+mGt
Gt = aG
 
yc;t + pd;tyd;t + qtht

(91)
where qt =
U2;t+1
U1;t
is the rental rate for housing (see Davis and Heathcote, 2005 for details).
5.2.6 The equations for external Shocks: 6 equations
The housing demand shock
lnh;t+1 = (1  h) ln(0)h + h lnh;t + "h;t+1
The money shock: Taylor Rule for interest rate Rt:
lnRt+1 = lnR0 +  ln

1 + t
1 + 0

+ gdp ln

GDPt
gkGDPt 1

+ "R;t+1
The intermediate goods production shocks (i = b;m; s):
zi =
X
j=b;m;s
zjBi;j + "i;t+1
The volatility of entrepreneur's production technology coecient $t:
!;t+1 = 
1 
0 

!;te
"t+1
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A competitive equilibrium is dened by the decision rules for (aggregate capital, entrepreneurs
capital, households (patient and impatien) labor, entrepreneur's labor, entrepreneur's net worth,
investment, the cuto productivity level, household (patient and impatien) consumption, and
entrepreneur's consumption) given by the vector:
kt+1; k
e
t+1;Ht;H
e
t ; Xt; !t; ct; c
e
t ; c
0
t; i
0
ht; N
0
t ; w
0
t; b
0
t; h
0
t; n
0
bt; n
0
mt; n
0
st
	
where these decision rules
are stationary functions of

Kt; Zt; ht; zi;t2fb;m;sg!;t; "M;t+1;"h;t+1
	
, all markets clear and all
the rms, households and entrepreneurs solve their respective maximization problems, along with
sets of equations representing the laws of motion for the sector specic shocks (zt;i2fb;m:sg); the
monetary shock, the preference shock and the uncertainty shock. In total, there are 62 variables:
c; ik; ph; ih;K; r;N;w; pl; b; Rb;ms;; c
0; i0h; N
0; w0; b0; h0; R; h; qk; qh; R0; q0b; q
0
h; s;$; ; yh; Z; c
e;
xb; xm; xs; x1i;j(6); yc; yd; pb; pm; ps; pd; kb; km; ks; nb; nm; ns; n
0
b; n
0
m; n
0
s; zb; zm; zs; G; h;m
G for
62 equations to be solved.
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